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Abstract
The introduction of LTE over unlicensed bands (LTE-U) will enable LTE base stations (BSs) to
boost their capacity and offload their traffic by exploiting the underused unlicensed bands. However, to
reap the benefits of LTE-U, it is necessary to address various new challenges associated with LTE-U and
WiFi coexistence. In particular, new resource management techniques must be developed to optimize
the usage of the network resources while handling the interdependence between WiFi and LTE users
and ensuring that WiFi users are not jeopardized. To this end, in this paper, a new game theoretic
tool, dubbed as multi-game framework is proposed as a promising approach for modeling resource
allocation problems in LTE-U. In such a framework, multiple, co-existing and coupled games across
heterogeneous channels can be formulated to capture the specific characteristics of LTE-U. Such games
can be of different properties and types but their outcomes are largely interdependent. After introducing
the basics of the multi-game framework, two classes of algorithms are outlined to achieve the new
solution concepts of multi-games. Simulation results are then conducted to show how such a multi-
game can effectively capture the specific properties of LTE-U and make of it a “friendly” neighbor to
WiFi.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile data traffic has experienced an exponential growth during the last decade and it is
expected to continue increasing by 1000 times in the upcoming five years [1]. Such multimedia
traffic demand with a high quality-of-service (QoS) requirement has strained the capacity of
current wireless networks and gave rise to new challenges such as backhaul management,
resource allocation, and interference management.
One promising approach to cope with the continuously increasing data traffic and meet
the stringent QoS of emerging wireless services, is by enabling LTE base stations (BSs) to
exploit the readily available unlicensed spectrum [2]. Although offloading part of the LTE traffic
to the unlicensed bands can considerably increase the performance of cellular networks, the
heterogeneity of the devices coupled with the disparity of the medium access protocols that
are used by the WiFi and LTE-U access points (APs), rise new challenges that need to be
addressed before these networks can reach their true potential [3]. In fact, if the LTE BSs transmit
continuously over the unlicensed bands, the WAPs will experience high interference from the
BSs resulting in large backoff durations that prevent the WAPs from serving the regular WiFi
users.
Thus, to avoid the deterioration of the WiFi network’s performance, cellular BSs must adapt
their offloaded traffic based on the WAPs activities. This will in turn impact the QoS guarantees
that can be provided by the BSs as it will depend on the varying WiFi traffic load on the unli-
censed bands. Hence, new resource management techniques are necessary to ensure a harmonious
coexistence of the two technologies. To this end, the traditional resources allocation mechanisms
at both LTE and WiFi networks need to be modified to account for the interdependence between
the devices in the two networks. The coupled resource management decisions of the users at the
inter-network and intra-network level, as well as the heterogeneity of the LTE-U system motivate
the adoption of game-theoretic solutions [4].
Game theory is a set of mathematical tools used to model and analyze the complex interactions
between independent rational players with coupled objectives. It has been extensively used in
communications, networking and signal processing, and has proven to be useful for addressing
many problems in these systems [4]. In particular, game theory has been recently used to design
efficient algorithmic solutions for resource allocation problems in LTE-U [5]–[8].
3In [5], the authors modeled the sharing problem of unlicensed bands among operators as
one-shot and repeated noncooperative game. In [6], a similar problem is also formulated as a
repeated noncooperative game for more general utility functions. The work in [6] shows that
operators can reach a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The authors in [7], [9] formulated the
unlicensed spectrum allocation problem with uplink-downlink decoupling as a noncooperative
game in which the SBSs are the players that select the unlicensed channels over which they serve
their users. The goal of the SBSs is to optimize the uplink and downlink sum-rate while balancing
the licensed and unlicensed spectrums between the users. A learning algorithm is proposed in
[8] for the joint interference management and traffic offloading problem at the unlicensed bands.
The authors in [10] use classical optimization tools to define the optimal unlicensed spectrum
allocation to the BSs.
Despite being interesting, most of these works consider models in which the dependence
between the LTE and WiFi networks is ignored. In fact, this existing body of work [5]–[10] has
treated allocation problems on each network independently. In fact, in LTE-U, the inter-network
interactions can significantly impact the outcome of the resource allocation models. For instance,
a dual-mode BS that has access to both networks can benefit from the available information on
one network to improve its performance on the second network. This is a critical point especially
for BSs as they must ensure the expected QoS by their users, while over unlicensed bands, there
are no guarantees regarding the delivery. Moreover, the BSs must account for the payoff of the
WAPs to reach a fair coexistence on the unlicensed bands and adapt the allocation of the licensed
bands accordingly.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide a new game-theoretic framework that allows
to address and capture the following characteristics of LTE-U: 1) disparity in the used access
protocols by the LTE BSs and the WAPs on the unlicensed bands, 2) heterogeneity of the
network devices with the integration of dual-mode BSs and the existing WAPs and BSs, 3)
different access bands and QoS requirements, and 4) need of WiFi-aware algorithms to ensure
a fair coexistence on the unlicensed spectrum. To this end, we introduce a novel multi-game
framework, that generalizes existing game-theoretic solutions and enables one to capture all
the specific characteristics of LTE-U. In this regard, we first provide an overview of the main
challenges of LTE-U. Then, we describe the proposed multi-game model and new solution
concepts that are desirable in such networks. Finally, we provide simulations results to validate
4the proposed multi-game framework and we discuss future opportunities in this space.
II. LTE OVER UNLICENSED: OVERVIEW AND CHALLENGES
LTE-U allows an LTE system to exploit the unlicensed bands so as to offload a portion
of its traffic, thus reducing the overall congestion over the licensed spectrum. This is ensured
via the use of carrier aggregation technologies as well as the development of dual-mode BSs
that can transmit simultaneously over licensed and unlicensed bands. Multiple techniques have
been advocated recently by academia and industry to reach a harmonious coexistence over the
unlicensed bands by preventing the LTE BSs from harming the WiFi users. Such techniques can
be classified into two categories illustrated in Figure 1, [2]:
• LTE-WiFi link aggregation (LWA): LWA is enabled by integrated LTE/WiFi BSs equipped
with a WiFi interface and an LTE interface. Thus, the BSs are able to transmit simulta-
neously over the licensed and unlicensed bands and then use link aggregation to form a
larger transmission bandwidth. In LWA, the transmitting BSs use the same medium access
technique as WiFi known as listen-before-talk (LBT), in which users sense the channels
and transmit only if the medium is sensed to be idle.
• LTE-U and licensed assisted access (LAA): LAA uses LTE carrier aggregation technologies
to combine LTE in the licensed bands with LTE in the unlicensed bands. This is ensured
by dual-band BSs that can adaptively switch between licensed and unlicensed bands via the
same LTE interface. In LAA, an LBT-like technique is used to access the unlicensed bands
with longer sensing periods. Based on the observed medium activities, the BSs can then
determine the fraction of time they use the channels. On the other hand, LTE-U is a more
open model in which BSs do not have any regulation constraints regarding the fraction of
time they use the unlicensed channels or the caused interference to the WiFi users.
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Fig. 1: LTE-U network model.
LTE-U does not require any changes in the LTE air interface protocol, enabling an early
deployment of the technology in many countries including the USA, South Korea, China, and
India. However, regular users (i.e., the common people using WiFi), are starting to raise serious
objections about cellular operators taking over their bands [11]. In fact, without regulatory
requirements in LTE-U, LTE BSs can significantly impact the performance of WiFi users as WiFi
users cannot access the channels when they sense a high interference level from the continuously
transmitting BSs. Thus, LTE-U introduces new challenges that must be addressed to make its
impact on WiFi of equal magnitude as that of another WiFi network:
• Heterogeneity in device types and access protocols: The heterogeneity of the APs in cellular
networks appears in the cell coverage and the transmit power which are typically lower at the
WAPs compared to the LTE BSs. Moreover, the APs use different medium access control
methods. To access the channels, WAPs use carrier sense multiple access with collision
avoidance (CSMA/CA), in which WAPs sense the channel and attempt to avoid collisions.
When the sensed interference level exceeds a predefined threshold or a collision occurs, the
transmitting WAPs enter a period of binary exponential backoff prior to attempting another
transmission. On the other hand, BSs scheduling techniques, such as orthogonal frequency
division multiple access (OFDMA) that can guarantee QoS by dividing the bandwidth into
a number of physical resource blocks allocated to multiple BSs at the same time.
• Traffic offloading and QoS requirements: In contrast to LTE networks in which the resources
are preallocated to maximize the QoS of the users, WiFi networks do not provide any QoS
guarantees. Consequently, when LBT is used by the BSs, a random offload of the content by
6the BSs may result in a discontinuous service and a degraded QoS for the LTE users. Thus,
new resource allocation approaches must be developed in the LTE network to allocate the
network resources while being cognizant of the type and the requirements of the contents
in terms of data rate as well as the load of the WiFi network.
• Cross-technology interference and collisions: When LTE and WiFi exist over the unlicensed
spectrum, the WAPs are subject to excessive interference if the power regulation in WiFi
is not respected by the LTE users or the number of coexisting BSs is large. Thus, the
allocation of unlicensed channels to the BSs must consider the impact of the offloaded
traffic on the throughput of the WAPs. In fact, when the interference is sensed higher
than a predefined threshold, the WiFi users are not able to decode the transmitted content
correctly and thus stop the transmission and backoff for an exponentially increasing time
duration. This results in a deterioration of the WiFi performance if the LTE users keep
transmitting over the unlicensed channels without taking into account the incumbent users
of the WiFi network.
Given the characteristics of LTE and WiFi networks, the resource management decisions of the
APs are highly interdependent. For example, this can appear through the data rate achievable by
the APs which depends on all the APs transmitting over the same channel. This interdependence
between the resource management decisions of the APs makes game theory a natural tool to study
and analyze such networks. In this regard, in [5]–[8], game-theoretic solutions were proposed
to address the new challenges of LTE-U for a fair coexistence of LTE and WiFi networks.
However, in traditional game-theoretic analysis of LTE-U [5]–[8], the resource allocation
problems are formulated as single games. Hence, one typically analyzes the resource allocation
problems at the WiFi and LTE networks independently, ignoring the impact of the interdepen-
dence of the two networks. In other words, the outcome of the resource allocation and the
possible available information on one of the networks is not exploited at the other network.
Such information can be easily made available by the dual-mode APs that belong to both WiFi
and LTE networks and thus, can be used as a feedback at one of the networks to improve its
performance.
Moreover, in contrast to similar ideas such as cross-system learning in [8], the allocation of
resources in LTE-U must account for the multiple coexisting LTE and WiFi systems as well
as their impact on one another. This is necessary to capture the heterogeneity of the APs, their
7different utilities and objectives in the networks depending on the resources for which the players
contend such as licensed and unlicensed bands. These specific characteristics of LTE-U that are
ignored in [8], can enable the BSs to adapt their resource allocation methods by exploiting the
feedback from the other games (of possibly different type), and thus, not to jeopardize the data
rate of the incumbent WAPs in the unlicensed bands.
To capture and leverage the multi-mode transmission that is specific to LTE-WiFi networks,
new approaches should be developed and used to address the new challenges in these networks.
In the next section, we introduce a holistic game-theoretic framework to model the resource
management problems while fully exploiting the properties that are specific to LTE-WiFi net-
works.
III. MULTI- GAMES FOR LTE-U
Here, we propose the framework of multi-game theory as a new tool suitable to capture the
inter-network and intra-network interactions between the users in LTE-WiFi networks. A multi-
game G is a game that is composed of multiple interdependent games G = {G1, ...,GN}. Each
game G1 models a specific resource management problem at the WiFi level, LTE level or coupled
level. Multi-games can be defined by three parameters, the players, the actions, and the utility
function. The players can be BSs, WAPs, LTE user equipment (UEs), or WUEs, each of which
is associated a set of actions from which it can choose it strategy. The goal of each player is to
select the strategy that maximizes a utility function that corresponds to its goal in the network.
For example, BSs aim to maximize the experienced quality by their users over both licensed and
unlicensed bands. On the other hand, based on the best-effort service, WiFi users would prefer to
deliver a maximum amount of data. The utility is given by a function um(a−m, {oi}n=1,..,N\n),
which depends on the actions that are selected by all its co-players in the game Gn as well
as the outcome of all the other games denoted oi for each game Gi. For instance in LTE-U,
the throughput of a WiFi user is limited by the interference from both BSs and WiFi users
transmitting over the same channel.
The defined multi-game framework for LTE-U have two key properties:
• Heterogeneity of the games type: Each of the formulated games to model one of the resource
allocation problems in both networks can be of different type. For instance, the allocation
of the unlicensed bands to the WAPs can be formulated as a cooperative game while the
8allocation of the licensed bands to the BSs as a two-sided matching game. When considering
the power allocation problem of the APs, a noncooperative game can be more suitable. The
problems can even be formulated as classical non-game theoretic optimization problems.
• Interdependence between games: In addition to the utilities of the players that depend on
the outcome of the other games, the dependence between the games can appear in two other
ways. Each game of the multi-game can be an inter-network or intra-network game, thus,
a game can be played excursively by WiFi users, LTE users, or network operators but it
can also be played by a combination of these players. Moreover, the set of actions of the
players can be the same for many games such as the APs that can be selected by either
WUEs, LTE UEs and UEs having both functionalities.
Hence, in contrast to the popular two-level Stackelberg games in which the dependence
between the games and the players appears only through the utility that is a function of the
outcome of the other game, in the proposed multi-game model, in addition to the multi-level
structure of the game, the dependence between the games can appear in various ways.
In such multi-level games, the incumbent players at the considered network should have
priority in accessing the network resources. Thus, when allocating unlicensed bands, the WiFi
game is considered as the first-level game giving priority to the WAPs. Then, the players of each
game respond to the decisions of the players at the higher-level games while simultaneously,
anticipating the decisions of the players at the lower-level games and their possible reactions.
The proposed multi-game framework aligned with the idea of multi-resolution game theory in
[12]. However, in contrast to the concepts in [12] which are mainly aligned with problems in
security and resilience of control systems, we consider games of different types while focusing
on LTE-U resource management.
A. Multi-Game Solution Concepts
Having presented the general multi-game model, the goal now is to define suitable solution
concepts that can achieve an optimal resource allocation across the LTE and WiFi networks as
well as the unlicensed bands. Nash equilibrium (NE) and stability are the two solution concepts
that can be desirable depending on the formulated games. The NE is suitable for games such
as noncooperative games while stability is defined in games such as cooperative and matching
games in which groups of players are formed/matched. An equilibrium represents the state in
9which none of the players can improve its utility by a given deviation, i.e., by selecting another
action given that the actions of the other players are fixed. On the other hand, stability refers to
the state in which a player would not have the incentive to leave its group of players given that
the other players have selected their partners or group mates.
Applying classical equilibrium and stability notions to LTE-U will not be able to capture the
interdependence between the games. Such conventional solutions do not account for the WiFi
users’ performance which is affected by the LTE users through the increase of collisions number.
Thus, novel LTE-U oriented equilibrium and stability concepts must be defined to protect the
WiFi users while maximizing the benefit of the LTE users on the unlicensed bands. To this
end, we propose two solution concepts, multi-game equilibrium (MGE) and multi-game stability
(MGS) that can be characterized depending on the class of games used to formulate a given
LTE-U problem. MGE and MGS represent the states in which all the WiFi users have reached
a minimum target utility and all the LTE users have maximized their utility. In this state:
1) None of the WiFi users can reach the target utility by changing its strategy, given the actions
of all LTE and other WiFi users fixed,
2) None of the LTE users can improve its utility by changing its strategy, given the actions of
all WiFi and other LTE users fixed.
At the equilibrium, all the WiFi users are satisfied by their utility and none of them can
make any further improvements. Next, we present two new classes of algorithms to reach the
equilibrium states in the defined multi-game.
B. Algorithmic Solutions
To allow the players to achieve the MGE and MGS, the classical algorithms that are used in
single games cannot be applied anymore. In fact, such algorithms do not capture the interde-
pendences between multiple heterogeneous games, and do not allow the players to exploit the
specific properties in multi-games as some players can participate in multiple games at the same
time and thus can exploit the feedback from one game to improve their performance on another
game. Since the games are of multiple types, multiple algorithms must be combined to reach the
equilibria or stable outcomes. More importantly, the algorithms developed must be distributed
and provide adaptation to networks’ changes. Following the introduced solution concept, we can
define two classes of algorithms.
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1) Multi-game stability: To reach the stable state in wireless networks when the resource
allocation problems are formulated as matching games and coalitional formation games, decen-
tralized algorithms such as deferred acceptance [13] and merge-and-split [14] are used. These
decentralized algorithmic solutions have been shown to significantly improve the performance
of wireless networks with a low complexity. However, they are confined to single games.
Hence, to reach the MGS outcome defined in the previous section, new cross-system algorithms
must be developed. In such algorithms, dual-mode BSs must be able to observe their environment
on the WiFi network and exploit this information to define their preferred actions on the LTE
network which may correspond to the cells they want to join, or the other BSs with which they
prefer to share the bands. Moreover, the multiplicity of the stable states in classical algorithms,
introduces new algorithmic challenges that must be accounted for at each of the algorithms that
are defined to solve the games. In some cases, the players must be able to determine the worst
possible outcome, i.e. stable state, of all the other algorithms and respond to it.
2) Multi-game Nash equilibrium: Nash equilibrium is the basic solution concept in noncoop-
erative games. To reach this equilibrium, many learning algorithms can be used depending on
the characteristics of the considered game [15]. Similar to the stability case, classical learning
algorithms are designed for single games and do not account for the minimum utility requirements
of the players and hence cannot be used to reach the introduced MGE.
Consequently, new cross-system learning need to be developed for the multi-level games, to
account for the interdependence between the games. In such algorithms, the players can explore
the environment, learn their actions and exploit the feedback from the other bands and games.
The players can then learn their strategies, estimate and update their utilities iteratively based
on their observations.
C. Illustrative Multi-Game Models for LTE-U
Next, we show how the multi-game framework can be used to develop WiFi-aware resource
allocation methods. An illustrative example is provided in Figure 2, in which the multi-game
framework is applied for the allocation of licensed and unlicensed bands to BSs and WAPs. This
spectrum allocation problem depends on multiple parameters such as the traffic load generated by
the BSs and the WAPs which in turn depends on the users associated to each BS and each WAP,
respectively. In such network, the BSs, WAPs and users have different performance requirements
11
Association of the WAPs to the WUEs Association of the dual-mode BSs to the unlicensed bands
Association of the WAPs to the unlicensed bands Power allocation of all the LTE BSs on the licensed bands
Trac load of the WAPsTrac load of the WAPs
Trac load on each U-channel
Two-sided Matching Game  One-sided Matching Game
Coalition Formation Game Noncooperative Game
Trac load on each U-channel
Trac load on the licensed channels
Achievable QoS of the LTE users
Common playersCommon players
Associated channel s to the WAPs
Possible achievable QoS on U-channels
Common players
band1 band2
band3
p11,p12,p13 p21,p22,p23
p31,p32,p33
p41,p42,p43
Transmission power on the three bands
Fig. 2: Illustrative multi-game model in LTE-U.
and all aim to maximize their own utilities that are different. The interdependence between the
four games is shown in Figure 2 using the red arrows that represent the information that affects
the outcome of the game to which the arrow is directed. The green arrows connect every two
games that have common players.
1) Dynamic channel selection: The problem of unlicensed channel selection can be formulated
as a multi-game composed of two game:
• Association of the WAPs to the channels: The players in this game are the WAPs and they
aim to maximize a utility function which we assume to be the throughput which depends
on the interference of the BSs and WAPs on each channel.
• Association of the BSs to the channels: In this game, the players are the BSs and the
utility function can be considered the achievable physical rate which depends also on the
interference from the WAPs and BSs.
WAPs must be given priority as they are the incumbent users in the unlicensed band. The BSs
then, account for the outcome of the WAPs game and respond to their strategies avoiding the
deterioration of their throughput. For a more realistic model, we can account for the impact of
the associated APs to the selfish users that aim to optimize their individual rate. Two additional
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games can be added in this case and are the WUEs-WAPs association and the LTE UEs-BSs
association games, resulting in a four-levels multi-game.
2) Inter-operator spectrum sharing: This game consists of a set of operators that own a set
of BSs and contend for the unlicensed channels. Three games must be analyzed:
• Association of the WAPs to the unlicensed bands: The utility of the WAPs in this game is
the achievable throughput on each unlicensed channel.
• Association of BSs to the licensed and unlicensed bands: This game is played between the
BSs and the bands. The strategies of the operators that own the BSs in this case, depend
not only on the WAPs’ selected actions but also on their subscribers, the price they pay,
their minimum required QoS, as well as the load on the LTE network. In fact, if a user pays
a low price and there is a high traffic on the LTE network, the operator would prefer to
offload the user to the WiFi network to be able to guarantee the required QoS for the UEs
that pay a higher price. This can be done only if the unlicensed spectrum is not saturated
as the WAPs are the incumbent and have priority in using the spectrum. The utility of a
BS is the achievable physical rate by all its users over a channel.
• Association of the users to the operators: This game that is played by the operators and
user. Users aim to subscribe to the operator that offer the best deal in term of QoS/price
which depends on the selected channels by the operators’ BSs. On the other hand, operators
prefer the users who pay more and for which the requested QoS can be satisfied. The utility
of a user in this game is the difference between the achievable rate when served by a BS
that deployed by a given operator and the cost for that service. On the other hand, the utility
of an operator is the difference between the charged price to all the served users and the
cost of serving them.
IV. CASE STUDY: MULTI-GAMES IN LTE-U
To show the performance of the proposed multi-game framework, we perform simulations
on a networks composed of dual-mode BSs and WAPs that contend for 10 unlicensed bands.
Moreover, we consider a set of WUEs that aim to select the WiFi AP that maximize their
physical rate. Thus, three coupled games are formulated as three different matching games. The
network parameters are provided in Table I.
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TABLE I: Network parameters
Parameters Values
Number of BSs 40
Number of WAPs 30
Mean time of a successful transmission 5 µs
Mean time of a collision 1 µs
Mean time of idle channel 3 µs
Number of channels 10
RTS 20 bytes
CTS 14 bytes
DIFS 34 µs
SIFS 16 µs
Number of WUs 150
Transmit power of the WAPs 0.5W
Transmit power of the BSs 1W
• Association of WUEs to the WAPs: This problem can be formulated as a two-sided matching
game in which the WAPs aim to maximize the number of served UEs and the WUEs aim
to maximize their physical rate.
• Association of the WAPs to the unlicensed channels: This problem is formulated as one-
sided matching in which the WAPs aim to autonomously form groups on the unlicensed
channel that maximize their throughput.
• Association of the LTE BSs to the unlicensed bands: This problem is also formulated as
a one-sided matching game in which the BSs select the channel that maximize the mean
physical rate.
We can note from this formulation that WAPs participate in two games as players. Moreover,
the utility of the players in each game depends on the outcome of the other games. For instance,
the achievable physical rate by the WAPs depends on the unlicensed channels over which they
serve their users in the second game and also on the associated BSs to that channel via the
induced interference.
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A. Multi-game vs. classical single game
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Fig. 3: Multi-game vs. single game in U-bands allocation.
Figure 3 shows the sum-throughput of all the WAPs as a function of the traffic in the network.
Two approaches are compared, the single game and multi-game models. In the former, there is
no priority and all the BSs and WiFi can access the network similarly. In the latter, the WAPs
are given the priority by playing the two first games and choosing the actions that maximize
their utilities. Then, the BSs respond to their actions by using the unlicensed channels only when
they are not used by the WAPs. From Figure 3, we can see that the network saturates faster in
the single-game model compared to the multi-game. This is due to the fact that the BSs can
monopolize the network and transmit for an infinite time when the WAPs are not given priority.
This results in a sum-throughput that is 50 % lower for the WAPs, in the single game compared
to the multi-game case.
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B. BSs utility
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Fig. 4: BSs sum-rate with respect to the WiFi traffic load and number of WAP/APs.
Figure 4 shows how the BSs adapt the amount of offloaded traffic to the unlicensed channels
based on the number of WAPs that are considered in the network. In fact, the ability of adaptation
to network changes at the BSs allows us to show how the proposed multi-game framework
impacts the performance of the LTE-U network as compared to LBT and single game models.
In particular, we show the sum-rate of the BSs when increasing the traffic load of the WAPs
and the number of WAPs is the network. Figure 4 shows that as the number of WAPs increases,
the sum-rate of the BSs decreases. This is due to the limited capacity of the unlicensed bands
that saturates when increasing the load. Thus, based on the priority model, the BSs decrease the
amount of offloaded traffic over the unlicensed bands as the WiFi traffic increases.
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C. Multi-game vs. LBT
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Fig. 5: Sum-throughput of the WAPs in LBT and the multi-game.
In Figure 5, we show the sum-throughput of the WAPs as a function of the WAPs traffic load.
We compare the proposed multi-game model with LBT that is used in LAA and LWA. In the
case of LBT, the WiFi network saturates faster compared to the multi-game case and this is
due to the BSs that try to maximize the amount of offloaded content to the unlicensed bands.
Moreover, since all the BSs and WAPs use the same backoff parameters, all the APs have the
same priority. In the multi-game mode, the throughput increases by increasing the load in the
network until the network saturates. The sum-throughput of the WAPs significantly higher in the
multi-game compared to LBT.
V. FUTURE OUTLOOK
Clearly, multi-game theory is a promising approach to address the coupled resource allocation
problems raised by LTE-U. In this regard, several future opportunities and challenges can be
explored. One direction consists in the development of new approaches to analyze the existence,
uniqueness, and optimality of the MGE and MGS. Moreover, one must develop practical multi-
game learning algorithms, that can properly select, in a fully distributed manner, the most suitable
solution for the wireless system, as a whole. On the WiFi side, it is important to ensure through
the analysis of multi-game theory that the BSs do not jeopardize the performance of the WiFi
users.
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Another important task is to define user-centric approaches that determine which information
the terminals should transmit to capture the fact that the dual-mode BSs operate over different
bands. Then, the BSs should be able to exploit this information to dynamically optimize the QoS
of their LTE users and consequently, the performance of the network. The collected information
can also be leveraged to improve the convergence speed of the proposed algorithms.
In this paper, we have proposed a generic game-theoretic framework that can be applied to
solve any LTE-U problem. However, the game must be adapted to account for the network
characteristics such as the high density of small cell networks and the mobility patterns of the
users. To this end, the allocation of the licensed and unlicensed channels can be formulated
as mean-field games or on-atomic games. For each scenario, the game must be analyzed and
separate analytical results can be found regarding the existence, uniqueness of the MGE and
MGS outcomes.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a multi-game model to address the new resource allocation
problems raised by the introduction of LTE-U into wireless networks. Clearly, multi-game theory
can constitute a strong framework for the analysis of LTE-U systems and the development of
efficient resource allocation algorithms that account for the inter-network and intra-network
interdependences in such systems.
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